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VACANT LAND MANAGEMENT: A CHALLENGE
TO NEW YORK CITY
ROGER STAR.R*
F OR the nonlawyer, the opportunity to discuss legal questions is a rare
pleasure; one has been granted a license to describe defects lavishly,
without being required to suggest precise corrective measures. The prob-
lem to be dealt with here is surely one of the most serious in municipal
management. Vacant land-whether publicly or privately owned-is the
most limited of a city's assets. Curiously, while city governments are
charged with guarding their other assets most carefully, the wastage of va-
cant land continues apace, and no single arm of city government, at least
not in New York, is expected to conserve the city's vacant land, to increase
it (we will discuss how) where possible, and to assure its dedication to
those purposes which will best serve the city's present and future needs.
To the nonlegal mind, busy with practical problems in municipal
planning and housing policy, it would seem that legal analysis of present
practice and the legislation of an improved administrative machinery
deserve priority on the calendars of the profession.
What, in fact, is New York City's practice with its vacant land? In
general, the city is determined to sell all of its own vacant land as
quickly as possible, and to acquire nothing that is privately owned, except
to satisfy an immediate need. In capsule form, one might summarize
the results of this policy by pointing out that out of a total land area
(including land under water, but inside the United States bulkhead
lines) of 204,000 acres, less than ten per cent-approximately 23,000
acres-was estimated to be vacant in 1960.1 In the face of greatly in-
creased land needs for space-hungry automobiles, and to achieve tolerable
reduction of slum overcrowding, the hour is unquestionably late. One's
sense of crisis is heightened by the recollection that almost all of the
land in Manhattan, at any rate, was once not only vacant, but in fact
the property of the city corporation. Present MIanhattanites can be
grateful for Central Park and very little else in considering the land
policy of their political forebears.
In 1844, the City of New York adopted an ordinance which per-
mitted the sale of all real estate belonging to it and not in use or re-
served for future public use "at public auction, at such time and on
such terms" as the commissioners of the sinking fund of the city con-
sidered appropriate.2 This one ordinance made possible the alienation of
practically all that was left of Manhattan: almost one-seventh of the
* Executive Director, Citizens' Housing and Planning Council of New York.
1. There are no official figures on vacant land acreage in the city. The figurea u2d in
this article are estimates generally considered to be reliable.
2. New York, N.Y., Ordinances, ch. LX, § 35 (1359).
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island's area remained in 1844 in the city's own hands; within twenty
years it had been sold. The proceeds from the land sale were used to
pay the city's debt and to meet current operating expenses, but despite
the sale, the city's debt after twenty years was much greater than it had
been before, and the land, now in the hands of others, could no longer
return to the city some measure of the increased values resulting from
the demands of increased activity and population.
In exculpation of the municipal legislators of 1844, it might reason-
ably be pleaded that they could not foresee the immense growth of which
New York would be capable. The same excuse can hardly be made to-
day, and yet the city policy of land sale remains practically unchanged.
The City of New York is still selling off at public auction all the land
which it owns, provided only its government departments have no im-
mediately foreseeable use.3 In this circumstance, the city differs very
little, probably, from other major American cities.
The arguments advanced by city administrations in support of this
disposal policy have a familiar ring, hallowed by a hundred years of
municipal misfortunes. Selling the land, the story goes, puts it back on
the tax rolls. Unfortunately, the traditional under-assessment of vacant
land makes it unlikely that these properties actually bring in much addi-
tional tax revenue to the city. The word "unlikely" is used advisedly,
because, as a matter of fact, no one knows what revenue has actually
been produced from the land sold by the city at its regular sales. The
purchaser of city-owned vacant land at auction need not commit himself
to improving it. He may be purchasing it for any reason whatever; the
land is his, so long as he is willing to bid and able to pay a third of the
purchase price in cash, provided the price is $15,000 or more. Trans-
actions involving less than $5,000 must be on an all-cash basis.4 If the
purpose of selling the land is to increase the tax rolls, it would seem
prudent to investigate the wisdom of requiring filing of plans for a
legal improvement at the time of sale. The taxes levied against the
improvements are more important than those levied against the land.
It would probably pay the city to sell land cheap to someone who pro-
posed an immediate improvement, rather than to sell it at a higher price
to one who only wanted to speculate in vacant land on a long-term
basis. This suggestion has precedents in other city regulations. In the
case of zoning variances, for example, the Board of Standards and
Appeals, New York's zoning review authority, may demand that the
work covered in the variance be completed within a specified period of
3. See New York, N.Y., Charter § 384(b) (Supp. 1960); New York, N.Y., Administrative
Code §§ 384-5.0 to -6.0 (1957).
4. The terms and conditions of the sale are contained in the monthly notice of sale
issued by the Department of Real Estate.
[Vol. 29
VACANT LAND MANAGEMENT
time from the granting of the variance. No zoning board would grant
a variance without a specific proposal before it; should the city be less
cautious in disposing of its remaining lands?
The second argument usually advanced in support of the city's land
disposal policy is that the city needs the money it receives from the sales.
This is, in effect, a frank admission that the city is living on its capital
instead of its income, for the land sold is practically irreplaceable. At the
least, prudent portfolio control-which the city proudly claims in the
management of its pension and retirement funds0 - would imply that
the consideration received from the sale of one parcel be dedicated to
the acquisition of other, more urgently needed sites. There is hardly any
such dedication. There is, to be sure, a "real property fund" into which
proceeds from the sale of the city's real estate are paid7 - except when
the sale follows a tax foreclosure, as it most often does. Proceeds from
tax sales had been allocated to a tax deficiency account or a general fund
stabilization reserve fund--the "rainy day fund"--but recently even this
separation was done away with and the proceeds of such sales moved right
into the city's general fund in order to meet an increased expense budget
without a tax rise. If the city budget cannot be made to balance without
throwing in the proceeds from the sale of city property, a fiscal crisis is
being postponed, but surely not averted.
A third argument, somewhat more subtle, has also been suggested in
favor of the city disposal policy. The policy has been defended on the
ground that the sale of vacant land by the city is helpful to the assembly
of suitable building sites, because the private speculators who buy the
land are able to operate more effectively than would a city department.
Unfortunately, at this writing the city's records of ultimate re-use of
the vacant land sold at its auctions are too fragmentary either to support
or to contradict the theory. On the whole, it seems rather a vague sug-
gestion on which to base the city's land policy, and, if it works out in
practice that these sales do assist in building site assembly, one should
know what the cost to the city is. Perhaps the same or even better re-
sults could be obtained by intelligent land management in the hands
of a competent municipal agency.
5. New York, N.Y., Zoning Resolution, As Amended § 22-A (1954).
6. See the provisions regarding various pension systems in No%,, York, N.Y., Adminis-
trative Code G41-1.0 to -67.0 (1957), as amended, New York, N.Y., Adminktrative Code
§§ G41-3, 1 to -53.1 (Supp. 1960).
7. New York, N.Y., Charter § 254 (1957).
S. New York, N.Y., Charter §§ 131-32 (1957), as amended, New Yorh, N.Y. Charter
§ 132 (Supp. 1960).
9. New York, N.Y., Local Law 80, Dec. 16, 1960, amendcd the charter and the Admin-
istrative Code to allow the diversion to the general fund of about 75% of the future pro-
ceeds of public auction sales of properties seized for taxes. It vwas estimated that A0,C
to $60,00,00D would be thus diverted. N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1960, p. 30, col. S.
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The most striking feature of the city government's control over its
own vacant land is its haphazardness.
The Department of Real Estate, which conducts the sale, 10 acts, in
effect, as a broker for the city. Its assignment is the disposal of surplus
property, and like any broker whose income depends on volume, it would
appear to favor increased sales. The sales are restricted only by the re-
quirement that all property must be screened by the individual depart-
ments of the city against their foreseeable requirements.' If there is,
indeed, good reason for selling the land for which no foreseeable need
is apparent, this reservation system appears somewhat casual. A depart-
ment with an ambitious though unrealistic program might be able to
prevent the sale of land against the city's best interest.
There exists, in fact, a certain amount of bargaining back and forth
between the Real Estate Department, charged with the sale and not un-
naturally taking credit for the size of the receipts, and the individual de-
partments. The Planning Commission, when it is attempting to assemble
a large tract of land for some special purpose, such as an industrial park,
will actively enter into the process of negotiation with individual de-
partments, but these are unusual and exceptional cases, it would appear.
In general, vacant land is sold when no department has reserved it, and
the reservations themselves are seldom challenged. The city follows a
policy of land disposal, but follows it with something less than en-
thusiasm, and follows it for reasons that are not themselves related to
the question of land.
Yet beyond question the City of New York has reached a situation
of extreme stringency with regard to its vacant land. The Sanborn Map
Company directly counted 30,000 vacant acres in the city in 1955. In
1948, there were about 40,000 vacant acres in the city. It is therefore
a reasonable guess that the city, through new construction and the
dedication of park lands, has consumed almost one-half of the land in
its boundaries in the past few years.
Of course, by no means all of the land that was vacant in 1955 or
1948 was city-owned. To control the consumption of privately owned
vacant land, New York must rely primarily on zoning. The new zoning
resolution recently adopted by the city government 2 provides for strict
controls over residential densities, and in general, limits the develop-
ment of vacant land quite drastically. While the Planning Commission
has not said so, it would appear that it hopes by this zoning to cut down
the speculation in land in the underdeveloped sections of the city. The
commission has announced that it will be flexible in permitting rezoning.
One may imagine that, although the new zoning is initially restrictive, it
10. New York, N.Y., Charter § 1152 (Supp. 1960).
11. New York, N.Y., Board of Estimate Cal. No. 260(B), Jan. 8, 1959.
12. New York, N.Y., Zoning Resolution, Dec. 15, 1960.
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will find ways to admit greater residential density in the future, under
appropriate circumstances.
Zoning, as a regulative device for the development of vacant land,
must always steer a narrow course between over-restriction, with result-
ing land under-utilization on the one hand, and insufficient restriction
which permits land wastage through poor development on the other. In
the public hearings that are part of the rezoning process, it is unfortunate
that no party represents the city's need to get the maximum benefit from
its land resources.
The disposal of city-owned real property by public auction, in which
the fee is sold with no special restriction as to the land use beyond what
the zoning resolution provides, is a dramatic demonstration of the city's
insufficient land policy. It is only one such demonstration, and there are
other city acts which show a similar disregard of the critical nature of
land supply.
Obviously, at a time of almost no housing vacancy, unoccupied land is
of great importance, as the new housing for which it provides space con-
stitutes entirely a net gain to the city's housing inventory. Vacant land is
the key which opens the door to possible redevelopment of under-
developed or blighted sites. A land policy must promise, first of all, the
assembly of suitable construction sites. Either through holding vacant
land which is suitable for redevelopment, or through a process of barter,
or sale-and-purchase, the city's land-holding portfolio could be creatively
enlarged and made more rewarding.
A municipal land policy should also be calculated to increase the sup-
ply of viable building sites. Several important aspects of this question are
concealed within the vacant land statistics. The estimate of 23,000 pres-
ent vacant acres includes the land under water adjacent to vacant up-
lands. Here, again, one has only the sketchiest assurance that a city
policy has been formulated and is in process of execution for the filling-in
of such marginal lands. The land-fill operations of the city are conducted
by the Department of Sanitation in conjunction with the Parks Depart-
ment; this collaboration has used solid garbage to produce a usable re-
creational area on the shores of Jamaica Bay, along the edges of Staten
Island, on both the Arthur Kill and Lower Bay shores, and on the East
River in the Bronx. Floyd Bennett Field, an airfield in Brooklyn, stands
on land that was reclaimed similarly, and suction dredging of sand was
responsible for raising much of the present site of Idlewild International
Airport to its present elevation and grade. In the hands of a competent
city agency, charged primarily with the development of the city's land
resources, fill operations would play an important part, and the reinvest-
ment of the proceeds from land sales into raising the grade and elevation
of lands under water but within the federal bulkhead lines might be ex-
tremely profitable. Alternatively, the policy of selling lands under water
1961]
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should be scanned to see whether the obligation to raise the land within
the bulkhead lines to a usable grade should not be imposed on the new
owner, at least in appropriate circumstances.
A second source of building and park sites is concealed within the
vacant land estimates. The figures quoted are exclusive of streets,
whether these are real or merely mapped and not even acquired by the
city. Anyone who has explored the vacant or underdeveloped sections
of the city, map in hand, is likely to be startled by the number of streets
which appear on the map but are not to be found on the ground. The
streets were laid out on the official city map with the approval of the
Planning Commission, but at the instance of the Borough Presidents'
offices.13 The acquisition of title and the true opening of the street are
at the option of the Borough Presidents, 4 and the de-mapping is an ob-
scure process. There is ample reason to question the wisdom of the grid
system employed in the past, and the need for all of the streets that ap-
pear on the maps; the automobile has characteristically been given more
than its due in the city. Any saving in the mapping of streets means a
direct addition to the supply of vacant land. Nothing may be built in the
bed of a mapped street to which the city has not taken title. Despite the
obvious attraction of a policy of minimizing the areas of such streets, no
city agency is charged with a positive responsibility for cutting down the
waste implicit in these unreal mappings.
A third source of additional vacant land is to be found in the systematic
exploitation of the possibilities of superimposing one land use atop an-
other. The use of air rights over low level land uses is a prime example
of this possibility. A dramatic evidence of private imagination in the con-
servation of air rights and their subsequent exploitation is to be found
above the East River Drive in Manhattan. When land for the Drive was
originally acquired from private owners back in the 1930's, one owner,
the Phipps Estates, Inc., retained by contract the air rights above the
land that it was deeding to the city. These air rights were later sold for pri-
vate development, and two substantial cooperative apartments have been
constructed in the air rights, straddling the highway.
Other projects of considerable size have been announced for the air
rights over the Manhattan approaches to the George Washington Bridge, 5
13. New York, N.Y., Charter § 202 (1957).
14. See New York, N.Y., Charter §§ 291-301, (1957), as amended, New York, N.Y.,
Charter § 296 (Supp. 1960).
15. The air rights to a two-block area at the Manhattan approach were sold at public
auction by the Department of Real Estate for $1,065,000. The rights had been owned by
the Port of New York Authority, but, according to the Commissioner of the Department
of Real Estate, "The Port Authority decided the air rights were of no use" and sold them
to the city for $1. The planned apartments will rise from a platform spanning the area.
N.Y. Times, Aug. 18, 1960, p. 1, col. 4. The high price led to later speculation that the
rights might be tax-exempt. Air rights are normally taxed indirectly by an increased
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and the Mott Haven (Bronx) yards of the New York Central Railroad."
As these words are written, it is rumored that a similar project will be
constructed above the subway yards in upper Manhattan on the Harlem
River.
The possible usefulness of air rights is, however, subject to difficulties
imposed by present legal restrictions and administrative practices. When
the proposal to erect middle income housing above the Port of New York
Authority approachway to the George Washington Bridge was first made,
the city considered selling the air rights for a nominal one dollar. The pro-
posed housing development was to be a limited-profit housing company co-
operative, financed by a city loan.17 The greater the sum of money re-
ceived by the city for the air rights, the larger the city loan would have
to be, the higher the rents. The advantage to the city in achieving a high
sales price for the rights must be weighed against the amount of city
credit that would have to be extended to provide the financing of that
very purchase price. An even more compelling reason for questioning the
sales policy would be that obviously the higher the sales price for the
rights, the higher the rents or carrying charges, and the less the new hous-
ing would cater to the income levels most in need of it. But legal uncer-
tainties which seem to insist on a public auction for the disposal of city-
owned property (although the Public Housing Law specifically authorizes
municipalities to give land to limited-profit housing companies on what-
ever terms may be appropriate) 18 prevented the best use of the air rights.
The price at the public auction soared to $1,065,000. Naturally, prospec-
tive sponsors were able to frame their bids in the knowledge that the
higher land price would mean, in the main, a higher city loan, and, since
the sponsor's profit is controlled as a percentage of the total project cost,
a higher possible profit. Instead of serving the lowest possible income
assessment on the land below, but in this case the land below is out of the city's juris-
diction and the Port Authority is itself tax-esxempt. N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 19 O, § 0, p. 1,
col. 6.
16. The railroad yards are forty feet above street level. A $ 6,C[DCO middle-income
cooperative apartment development--eventually there will be twenty-three buildings, each
twenty stories high-will be erected on a concrete platform Epanning the tracks and
flush with the street. The concrete base will be supported by columns sunk Lztwczn the
tracks below. The Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butchers Workmen of North America,
sponsor of the project, leased the air rights over the forty-acre site from the New York,
Central System. The lease is for sLaty years, with an option for a forty-year renewal, the
railroad to receive $750,000 a year in rent when the development is compluted. N.Y. Times,
M ay 26, 1960, p. 1, col. 4.
17. The Limited-Profit Housing Companies Law, N.Y. Pub. Housing Law §§ 301-24,
aids the development of low-income housing projects by making low-interczt mortgage
loans available to private builders forming a company under the act. The act providC for
two kinds of programs, one financed by state loans, § 311, and the other financed by
municipal loans, § 312.
13. N.Y. Pub. Housing Law §§ 120, 125(3).
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group-which is the objective of the Limited Profit Housing Company
provisions of the New York State Public Housing Law 19-this handling
of this potential land site made it available to the highest possible income
group. The only limitation on the bidding was the possibility of getting
the cost of the future dwelling units so high that no one would buy them
from the sponsor.
Finally, any program to maximize land resources must concern itself
also with the reviewing of all legal restrictions on the use of land which
tend to limit its availability. For example, the new Zoning Resolution of
New York City imposes stringent parking requirements on residential
properties, especially where these are mapped in outlying sections of the
city. A parking space must be provided for every dwelling unit in all the
residential zones up to the R4 zone.2" Parking or garage space must be
provided for eighty-five per cent of the units in R5.2 1 With only one
hundred spaces possible on an acre, this would mean that approximately
half of a building lot in this zoning district would be taken up with park-
ing spaces. Obviously, some form of multi-story garage is required, but
the Multiple Dwelling Law, a state instrument, requires the construction
of fully-enclosed garages in connection with any multiple dwelling,22 and
the cost of these is exorbitant. It is clear that if we are to get the maxi-
mum benefit from land, some method (a number have been suggested by
prominent architects) must be found to provide multi-story parking that
will be both attractive and cheap, and that will save a much larger por-
tion of the land for recreation and usable open space.
It is clear that the present inchoate state of city land policy means that
no single board, department or authority will take the lead in providing
this type of legal relief, as well as the many others that must be obtained
in order to simplify constructive land use.
It is the writer's contention that a land policy must be developed and
executed. Essentially, the city's vacant land is a resource to be conserved
and managed in much the way that the trustees of the city's pension funds
manage the accumulated moneys. A way must be found to entrust the
city's land management, including, but not limited to, the development of
the city's own portfolio of owned land, to, a board of trustees, or an au-
thority, whose members would include at least the Commissioner of Real
Estate and the Chairman of the City Planning Commission. Constitu-
tion of a new body does not, of course, guarantee the solution of every
problem, but without the concentration of responsibility for stretching
land resources, the present indeterminate pattern of wastage and un-
concern will surely continue.
19. N.Y. Pub. Housing Law § 302.
20. New York, N.Y., Zoning Resolution § 25-23, Dec. 15, 1960.
21. Ibid.
22. N.Y. Mult. Dwelling Law § 60.
